We estimate an alternative type of monetary policy rule, termed Calvo rule, according to which the central bank is assumed to target a discounted in…nite sum of future expected in ‡ation. Compared to conventional in ‡ation forecast-based rules, which are typically of the Taylor-type with discrete forward looking horizons, this class of rule is less prone to the problem of indeterminacy. Parameter estimates obtained from GMM estimation provide support for Calvo-type rules, suggesting that the Federal Reserve targeted a mean forward horizon of between 4 and 8 quarters.
Introduction
Many central banks claim to be forward-looking in their policy actions. In practice, this amounts to targeting conditional forecasts of the feedback variables re ‡ecting macroeconomic conditions. Clarida et al. (1998 and 2000) present empirical evidence of this forward-looking behavior for several monetary authorities including the Federal Reserve. They estimate a forward-looking Taylor-type rule i t = i t 1 + E t t+h + E t x t+q ;
where captures the degree of interest rate smoothing such that current period interest rates (i t ) respond gradually to lead values of in ‡ation ( t+h ) and a measure of the output gap (x t+q ), corresponding to targeting horizons h and/or q > 0. Interest-rate feedback rules of this type are extensively discussed in the literature (see Woodford, 2003 , for example) and mimic monetary policy behavior reasonably well.
Nevertheless, the analysis and implementation of this type of rule raises di¢ culties. First, it is clear that the targeting horizon 1 h should be viewed as part of the parameter set f ; ; g de…ning policy choices. Yet when attempting to replicate the behavior of central banks, researchers estimating policy rules do not directly estimate h, instead …xing it at particular horizons.
Values for h may be determined either by their implied stabilization properties in speci…c macro This paper adopts an empirical strategy which has the potential to circumvent the obstacles described above. We discuss how a 'Calvo-type' in ‡ation-forecast based rule (hereafter Calvorule) can be used to estimate the degree of forward-lookingness. This rule, which is based on a discounted sum of current and all future in ‡ation rates, has recently been proposed by Levine 
Calvo-Rules
The rule we examine falls within a broader class of rule referred to in the literature as In ‡ation Forecast Based (IFB) rules. Despite their susceptibility to indeterminacy, such rules have strong intuitive appeal, and the arguments in support of them are well known. First, as monetary policy maximally impacts in ‡ation with a considerable lag, it follows that policy decisions should target a horizon where the expected macroeconomic impact is judged greatest. Second, through targeting forecasts IFB rules implicitly draw upon a wide array of information relating to both current and future macroeconomic conditions. In light of these arguments, the development of IFB rules which are less susceptible to indeterminacy is desirable. The Calvo rule is such an innovation. Suppose the interest-rate rule is written as
where
where denotes the policymaker's response to deviations from an output target ' measures the extent to which current and all future in ‡ation rates are discounted. This formulation is akin to Calvo-type contracts (Calvo, 1983 ) commonly used in New Keynesian Phillips curves. The Calvo rule can be interpreted as a feedback from expected in ‡ation that continues at any one period with probability ' and is switched o¤ with probability 1 '. The probability of the rule lasting for h periods is (1 ')' h , hence the mean forecast horizon is (1 ')
). With ' = 0:5, for example, we would have a Taylor rule as in (1) with one period lead in in ‡ation
This rule can also be seen as a special case of a Taylor-type rule that targets h-step-ahead expected rates of in ‡ation (with h ! 1)
albeit one that imposes a speci…c structure on the i 's (i.e., a weighted average of future in ‡ation with geometrically declining weights). This has an intuitive appeal and interpretation, re ‡ecting monetary policy in an uncertain environment: the more distant the h-step ahead forecast, the less reliable it becomes, hence the less weight it receives.
Another interesting feature of this speci…cation type is that, conveniently rewritten, it permits direct estimation of the mean lead horizon. In order to estimate the rule, it is possible to manipulate (2) and (3) to give
Rearranging in terms of i t yields
One can then estimate the parameter coe¢ cients of (2) using GMM as explained next. . We augment (6) by introducing a random policy shock " t
Empirical Analysis
that accounts for forecast errors or interest rate deviations from the level prescribed by the rule. If we assume that the shocks are orthogonal to any variable in the information set at time t 1, we can estimate the parameters of (7) by GMM using the moment conditions implied by equation. 3 In particular, we employ the iterative GMM estimator, with a weighting matrix using the Bartlett kernel, with an automated lag-length selection procedure as in Andrews (1991) . We also consider the Continuous-Updating GMM estimator (CUE), which possesses superior large and …nite sample properties when compared to the standard GMM estimator, as discussed in We obtain results similar to Clarida et al. (2000) regarding the di¤erences in the estimated rules across the two samples. Indeed, point estimates of the policy reaction to expected in ‡ation appears below the benchmark values of 1 when the full sample is employed (and non-signi…cant for the CBO gap), whereas the estimated 's appear signi…cantly larger than 1 for the VolckerGreenspan period. As for the estimates of ', the implied average forecasting period ranges from 1.5 to 3 quarters, the exception being CUE estimates with the CBO gap, with an unreasonable degree of forward-looking behavior. Note, however, that the J-test for overidentifying restrictions for the CUE produced somewhat low p-values for the pre-Volcker period, which suggests that there may some problems with this speci…cation for this sample period.
However, if we only consider the Volcker-Greenspan period, estimation results appear to be much more sensible. First, all coe¢ cients are statistically signi…cant and the J-test produces higher and more reasonable p-values, despite the smaller sample. Secondly, the coe¢ cient on in ‡ation expectations is estimated to be well above unity, a result consistent with the conclusion of Clarida et al. (2000) that the Fed adopted a more aggressive stance in the combat to in ‡ation after 1979. Last, but not least, estimates of ' are higher than the full-sample ones, corresponding to point estimates of the targeting horizon between 4.4 and 7 quarters. Note that in all cases, one cannot reject values of ' that deliver targeting horizons between 4 and 8 quarters, but a targeting horizon of just 1 quarter is always comfortably rejected, suggesting a high degree of forward-lookingness during the Volcker-Greenspan tenure.
For completeness, the stability properties of the our estimated rules were computed for a standard New Keynesian model
where = 0:99 is calibrated and Bayesian-estimated parameters, using US data, are = 3:91 and = 1:41 (see Batini et al. 2006) . All estimated rules achieve saddlepath stability, and are highly robust to variations in these values. 4 The more aggressive responses to expected in ‡ation in the Volcker-Greenspan era result in welfare outcomes that are considerably higher than the estimated rules in the full sample period.
Conclusion
We show the empirical usefulness of Calvo rules by estimating the targeting horizon of the Federal Reserve. Our results suggest that the practice of the Fed is consistent with a substantial degree of forward-looking behavior, reinforcing previous …ndings in the literature. There are, however ways in which our analysis might be extended. Future work might utilize forecast data, known to be integral to the decision on the interest rate by the FOMC, or 'real time'data as in Orphanides (2001) . We have also restricted our analysis to US policymaking. The fact that an increasing number of central banks now make publicly available their internal forecasts for in ‡ation and GDP makes a cross country study viable. 
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Note: standard errors in brackets.
